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Abstract 
We study a family of voting rules inspired by the peculiar protocol used for over 500 years by 
the Republic of Venice to elect its Doge. Such lot-based indirect elections have two main 
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1 Introduction
In 1268, the aristocratic Republic of Venice introduces a bizzarre system to
choose its Doge—its highest office as well as a life position. The protocol, in
force till the fall of the Republic in 1797, is an indirect election mechanism,
because voting rights are restricted to an electoral college. The latter is cho-
sen by a convoluted ten-round procedure, alternating voting with qualified
majorities and sortition. Each intermediate voting round elects the subse-
quent nominating committee; only in the tenth and final round the electoral
college directly votes to elect the Doge. Across rounds, the size of the college
is alternately increased by voting and reduced by lot, as we now describe.
The active electorate lies within the Great Council (Maggior Consiglio),
an assembly of male oligarchs. Its membership gradually increased from 480,
when it was instituted in 1172, to more than two thousand. The election
protocol starts by selecting at random thirty members of the Great Council,
among those aged thirty and above. This first group of thirty is reduced by
lot to a second committee of nine, that nominates a college of forty com-
ponents, individually approved by a qualified majority of seven out of nine.
This college of forty is reduced by lot to a committee of twelve, who nomi-
nates a college of twenty-five, individually approved by a qualified majority
of nine out of twelve. This committee of twenty-five is reduced by lot to a
college of nine, who elects a committee of forty-five, individually approved by
a qualified majority of seven out of nine. A final round of sortition over the
forty-five draws a committee of eleven who chose, with a qualified majority
of nine, the college of forty-one electors who actually vote to elect the Doge,
with a quorum of twenty-five votes. In addition, no family is permitted to
hold more than one member in each committee and nominee’s relatives are
forbidden to vote (Norwich, 1982:198–200; Tucci, 1982). Table 1 summarises
the steps of the Venetian procedure for the dogal election.
This curious procedure raises many questions: what was the purpose of
an indirect election where the electoral college was chosen by lot? What
were the consequences of imposing such large supermajorities? Why was
the procedure iterated so many times, varying the size of successive electoral
colleges and the quorum required to decide? This paper seeks answers to
these questions.
We put momentarily aside the alternation of sortition and elections and
we study a family of two-round voting mechanisms, called lot-based indirect
2
Round College size and minimum approvals
1 30 chosen by lot from the Great Council
2 9 chosen by lot
3 40 elected with the approval of 7/9
4 12 chosen by lot
5 25 elected with the approval of 9/12
6 9 chosen by lot
7 45 elected with the approval of 7/9
8 11 chosen by lot
9 41 elected with the approval of 9/11
10 1 elected with the approval of 25/41
Table 1: The Venetian protocol for electing the Doge.
elections, in which delegates chosen by lot out of a general assembly elect a
single winner by qualified majority.1 The extension to the iterated version
of the mechanism is discussed at the end of the paper.
A lot-based indirect election combines the use of the lot and the require-
ment of a supermajority to reach a decision.2 There is a body of literature
on the protective role played by these two elements towards minorities; see
Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Mueller et al. (1972), Mulgan (1984), and
Schwartzberg (2013). However, as far as we are aware, there is no mathe-
matical characterisation of how they offer such protection and, in particular,
of the differences between the two instruments. Moreover, understanding
their interaction might shed some light on the functioning of the Venetian
protocol and on its contribution to the long lasting political stability of the
Republic of Venice.
1 In 1273, Venice adopted a two-round protocol to elect the magistrates. An initial
group of forty, chosen at random from the Great Council, was reduced by lot to a com-
mittee of nine people who elected the magistrate with a qualified majority of six out of
nine. The use of iterations was later extended to magistrates’ elections (Tucci, 1982: 91).
The usage of two initial consecutive random draws in both the magisterial and the dogal
election protocols is commonly viewed as a practical solution to the problem of ensuring
a genuine random lot over a constituency as large as the Great Council.
2 One of the earliest uses of a supermajority rule other than unanimity was the election
of the Pope in 1179; selection by lot, instead, dates back to ancient Greece. Both were
widely used in the Middle Ages. For a history of the two institutions see Chapter 3 of
Schwartzberg (2013) and Wolfson (1899), respectively.
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We assume that the electorate is divided in two factions. This implies
that the protection accorded to minorities by the voting protocol can be
assessed as the probability that the winner is a candidate supported by the
minority. We investigate the properties of this minoritarian win probability
for different electoral protocols, and how it changes with the strength of the
minority representation in the general assembly.
When qualified majorities and college selection by lot are used sepa-
rately, we find that the supermajority rule is less favourable towards small
minorities than sortition, but this conclusion is reversed for minorities with
a sufficiently large membership. Thus, sortition not only makes the system
less susceptible to fraud, which is a plausible reason why Venetians intro-
duced it, but also affects how political representation is allocated.
We also evaluate the effects of the college size and the winning threshold
in lot-based indirect elections, carrying out a comparative static exercise on
how the minoritarian win probability changes with the number of delegates
and with the inclusiveness of the rule by which the college reaches a decision.
We show that a higher threshold for a qualified majority increases political
representation both for negligible and sizeable minorities. The role of the
college size is less clear cut and depends on the supermajority threshold
used: when this threshold is low, smaller colleges favour both negligible and
sizeable minorities; alternatively, more sizeable minorities might be better
off with a larger college size.
Across all the electoral protocols considered in this paper, the minoritar-
ian win probability is bounded above by the relative share that the minority
has in the general assembly. This upper bound is reached under the una-
nimity rule or, for lower qualified majorities, when the electoral college is a
singleton. This suggests that the supermajority threshold and the college
size are substitutes with respect to the protection of the minority.
A small literature has investigated the mathematical properties of the
election protocols in the Republic of Venice. Lines (1986) focuses on the last
election round and on approval voting. She compares the minority voters’
incentive to misrepresent their preferences under either plurality or approval
voting, and shows that the latter one induces minorities to express their true
preferences. Coggins and Perali (1998) look at the use of supermajority rule
and, leveraging a result by Caplin and Nalebuff (1988), show that under the
assumption of social consensus and for a large number of voters, the degree
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of supermajority used in the Venetian protocol produces a unique winner
and avoids voting cycles. Our paper is most closely related to Mowbray
and Gollmann (2007), who assume two factions and computationally sim-
ulate the original Venetian protocol, comparing it to some of its truncated
variants. Their main result is that iterating the procedure protects the mi-
nority because it raises the minoritarian win probability. Finally, Walsh and
Xia (2012) study the computational complexity of vote manipulation in a
two-round lot-based election with many factions.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents
the model and introduces the minoritarian win probability. Section 3 anal-
yses qualified majorities and sortition separately, comparing direct elections
based on a supermajority rule to lot-based indirect elections where simple
majority rule is used. Section 4 studies and elucidates the role played by
the college size and the winning threshold on the protection of minorities.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 A model of lot-based indirect elections
We begin with presenting our setup for a lot-based indirect election with
supermajorities. A general assembly of n individuals is to select a chair.
Each of the n agents is a known member of one of two factions. Let m ∈
(0, n2 ) denote the size of the minority faction and let µ =
m
n be its percentage
share of the total assembly size.
We assume that people from the same camp coordinate on a single can-
didate and focus on the electoral competition between the two factions,
skirting the analysis of intra-party disagreement and negotiations. Given
two undivided factions, their interaction ultimately boils down to a choice
between their two preferred options. This simplifies the analysis of the
electoral strategies because majority voting over two alternatives is non-
manipulable: if a voter cannot gain from misrepresenting his preferences,
we expect individuals to vote sincerely.3
An indirect election restricts the right to vote to an electoral college of
size c ≤ n, where n is the assembly size. Each delegate in the electoral
college casts a vote for one of the two candidates. The election is won by
3 When choosing over two alternatives, the approval voting used in the Venetian elec-
toral protocol is equivalent to the case where each voter only casts one ballot.
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the candidate who musters at least t votes out of the c available. To allow
for supermajorities we let t ∈ ( c2 , c]. For example, the simple majority rule
corresponds to the winning threshold t = b c2c + 1, where b·c is the floor
function, and unanimity to t = c. For convenience, we use a roman t for
the whole number of the winning threshold and a greek τ for its percentage
value, with τ = tc ∈ (12 , 1].
Given a supermajority threshold, the election is undecided when neither
candidate reaches t votes. In this case we assume that the voters reconvene
to reach an agreement. We do not model explicitly these negotiations and we
assume that a faction imposes its candidate with a probability proportional
to its strength in the committee: when the ballot is indecisive, a faction
with x members in an electoral college of size c wins with probability xc .
Thus, the outcome of the election is completely determined by the com-
position of the college: delegates vote sincerely and the total tally for a
candidate is equal to the number of delegates from his supporting faction
sitting in the electoral college. As this number varies, three outcomes can
occur: (a) if a faction controls at least t votes in the committee, then it can
secure the election of its candidate; (b) if it has less than c− t electors, then
its candidate is a sure loser; and (c) when neither group controls enough
votes to clinch the election, each of the two candidates has a positive prob-
ability of being the winner. Depending on the case, we say that a faction is
(a) decisive, (b) irrelevant or (c) influential.
To model the use of sortition when forming the electoral college, we
assume that the c delegates are chosen at random out of the n members from
the general assembly. Since draws are without replacement, the number of
minority faction’s members in the electoral college is a random variable that
follows the hypergeometric distribution.
Let px[n,m, c] denote the probability that exactly x = 0, 1, . . . , c mem-
bers from the minority faction sit in the college. The value of this probability
depends on three parameters: the total number n of members in the assem-
bly, the tally m of the minority faction and the size c of the electoral college.
Using the binomial coefficient
(
n
k
)
to denote the number of possible un-
ordered combinations of n items, taken k at a time, we have
px[n,m, c] =

(
m
x
)(
n−m
c−x
)(
n
c
) if x ≤ m
0 if x > m
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When convenient, we drop the square brackets and write px.
Before the electoral college is drawn, the outcome of a lot-based indirect
election is described by the probability of winning of either faction. We
focus on the probability w[n,m, c, t] that the winner is the minority’s can-
didate, called minoritarian win probability (mwp), and we compute it by
taking the expected value of the electoral outcome over all possible college
compositions. Given the probability distribution px[n,m, c] over the number
x of minority’s delegates, we get
w[n,m, c, t] =
t−1∑
x=c−t+1
px[n,m, c]
(x
c
)
+
c∑
x=t
px[n,m, c]. (1)
The first sum refers to the electoral colleges in which the faction is influential
and thus has a probability of winning proportional to its share xc of the
college; the second sum refers to the colleges in which it is decisive and
therefore it elects its candidate. As for px, we drop the parameters in square
brackets and write w when convenient.
The probability w is a measure of the protection that the electoral proto-
col gives to the minority faction. The higher its value, the more chances the
minority has to be the winner of the election. In what follows we investigate
the properties of w under alternative versions of the electoral protocol.
3 Supermajorities, sortition and minorities
A lot-based indirect election with supermajorities is a voting protocol that
mixes two ingredients: (a) the use of the sortition and (b) the requisite
of a large consensus to reach a decision. In this section we give a formal
characterisation of the effects that chance and qualified majorities play, with
respect to the political representation of minorities. Our purpose is to unveil
the differences between these two instruments. To this end, we compare two
protocols: 1) a direct election without sortition in which everyone votes
and decisions are reached with a qualified majority rule; and 2) a voting
protocol in which the electoral college is selected at random but decisions
are taken under simple majority rule. For both protocols we characterise
the probability w that a candidate backed by less than half the electorate
end up being the winner.
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3.1 Direct elections with supermajorities
Consider an election in which all the n individuals have the right to vote so
that c = n. Because the number of minority individuals voting is m < n/2,
a minority is never decisive, regardless of the majority threshold t. This
implies w < 1 in any non-randomized electoral procedure. Any political
representation the minority might receive is associated with it being influ-
ential and, therefore, it is at most equal to its percentage allegiance in the
general assembly. Since in a direct election a faction is influential when
n− t < m < t we conclude that, for any supermajority threshold t ∈ (n2 , 1],
the mwp is given by:
w =
{
0 if m < n− t
m
n if m ≥ n− t
Dividing the right-hand side by n and using µ = mn , this can be conveniently
rewritten as:
w =
{
0 if µ < 1− τ
µ if µ ≥ 1− τ
To enable a comparison of the minority’s protection across protocols we
give a graphical representation of the mwp as a function of the minority
percentage allegiance µ. Figure 1 plots w for three possible values of the
winning threshold: simple majority rule, a supermajority of four out of five
and the unanimity rule. The horizontal axis is for the fraction µ of minority
members in the general assembly and the vertical axis for the mwp. Clearly,
in our discrete setting w is a collection of dots corresponding to values of
µ = 1n ,
2
n , . . . , but, as a matter of convenience, here and in the following
figures, we plot it as a continuous function. As shown in the picture, the
effect of the supermajority is to allocate some “power” to minority factions
that are not too small but that would otherwise be cut out from the decision
process (see the leftmost panel of Figure 1). As the decision rule is made
more inclusive, i.e. for a larger winning threshold t, the protection increases,
as we can see moving rightward in Figure 1.
The degree of protection reaches its maximum when unanimity is re-
quired. In the latter case the minority has a probability of winning equal to
its percentage representation in the assembly. We can interpret this situa-
tion as a probabilistic version of proportional representation.4 Given that
4 In a single candidate election, straightforward proportional representation is impos-
sible. For a discussion of probabilistic proportional representation, see Amar (1984).
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Figure 1: Minoritarian win probability in a direct election.
proportional representation maximises political equality, supermajoritarian
rules in single district elections can be interpreted as a means to treat fac-
tions more equally.
A second effect of larger supermajority thresholds is that negotiations
to secure a winning majority occur more often, leading the parties to strive
for more inclusive and consensual decision making. This can be seen in
Figure 1: whenever the blue probability line lies on the diagonal w = µ, the
winner is chosen through negotiations. Thus, supermajority provisions also
engage majority and minority into bargaining. This can be a positive aspect
of the procedure as long as the search for a deal can be handled; if, instead,
the underlying culture of the political system is characterised by strong
interclan antagonism, a system that often requires the search of a consensual
solution could lead to the outbreak of civil war and to the institution of
an alternative political system. This possibility is well illustrated by the
markedly different experiences of the two, otherwise quite similar, maritime
republics of Genoa and Venice. Genoa was characterised by a stronger clan
structure that hindered cooperation and, more than once in its history, it
had to resort to some external authority to secure political stability. It
also underwent several constitutional reforms. Venice, instead, was more
successful in securing wide consensus and political order (Greif and Laitin,
2004).
The last feature of a supermajoritarian election procedure we want to
stress is related to the manipulability of the system. Except for the two
extreme cases of simple majority and unanimity, the mwp is discontinuous.
Going beyond a simple model where voters cannot change their party al-
legiance, such discontinuities provide strong incentives for bribery, because
a small number of turncoat voters may lead to a markedly different result.
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This suggests that a discontinuity in the probability of winning may be an
undesirable feature of the election protocol. The inclusion of all sorts of
precautions to avoid vote manipulation was standard in the statutes of me-
dieval Italian city states (Wolfson, 1889). This confirms that fraud in voting
was perceived as an extremely dangerous practice for the independence of
the city state, and that any effort to avoid it had to be made. As we show
in the following section, the issue of vote manipulation is less compelling in
lot-based elections.
3.2 Lot-based indirect elections
We now turn our attention to elections where the set of voters is reduced by
lot. As above, the outcome of the election depends only on the composition
of the electoral committee but selection by ballot turns the number of mi-
nority delegates into a random variable. In particular, whereas in a direct
election a minority is never decisive, when the voters are reduced by lot a
minority has a chance to be “upgraded” and become a majority within the
electoral college. When m > c, there is a positive probability the minority
becomes decisive and can impose its candidate. Nonetheless, this probabil-
ity is smaller than the probability that a minority in the general assembly
remains a minority in the electoral college. We formalise this intuition in
Proposition 1 which will later be used to study the degree of protection of
different lot-based voting protocols.
Proposition 1 If m < n/2, px[n,m, c] ≥ py[n,m, c] for any x < y such
that x+ y = c. Moreover px[n,m, c] > py[n,m, c] if x ≤ m.
The following two propositions characterise the minoritarian win proba-
bility by imposing a lower and a upper bound on w.
Proposition 2 If m ≥ c− t+ 1, the mwp in a lot-based indirect election is
strictly positive.
Proposition 2 clarifies that the selection by lot of the electoral college
gives some representation to the minority faction unless the latter is too
small. Given the size c of the electoral college and the winning threshold t,
the minority has a positive probability to see its candidate winning unless it
has not enough members in the general assembly to hope to contend a sure
10
majority to the rival faction in the college. This result confirms that the
use of sortition in election protocols promotes a more equitable allocation
of political representation.
A representation benefit for the minority, however, is a representation
deficit for the majority. Is such deficit too harsh? Proposition 3 shows that
the representation afforded by the protocol to minorities is not “unnecessar-
ily generous” because it is always smaller that the relative share µ that the
minority has in the general assembly or, in our probabilistic interpretation,
that the minority faction never gets more than proportional representation.
Proposition 3 For any value of n, m, c and t ∈ (c/2, 1], the minority
winning probability w in a lot-based indirect election is bounded above by µ.
In particular, w = µ under the unanimity rule.
To illustrate how sortition affects the minorities’s chance of winning, in
Figure 2 we plot the mwp for n = 100 and c = 10, under a simple majority
rule. As in Figure 1, the horizontal axis shows the fraction µ of minority
members in the general assembly and the vertical axis the probability w
that the minority wins; the dotted bisector w = µ represents proportional
representation. As illustrated in the figure, the mwp is bounded away from
zero for any non-trivial minority and it is bounded above by proportional
representation.
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Indirect	elections	with	simple	majority	rule	
Figure 2: Minoritarian win probability (n = 100, c = 10, τ = 0.5).
Compared to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that both supermajorities and
sortition are ways to protect the minorities. In both cases the represen-
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tation gained by the minority is smaller than proportional representation,
but sortition has the effect of smoothing out the changes in representation
associated with changes in the strength of the minority: the probability of
winning in lot-based indirect elections moves smoothly with µ and this, as
discussed before, can possibly reduce the incentive to manipulate the elec-
tion by inducing some voters to switch allegiance.
4 The role of winning thresholds and college size
The adoption of a lot-based indirect election protocol involves the choice
of two key parameters: the majority threshold t and the college size c. To
evaluate this constitutional choice, we turn to a comparative static analysis
of the role of t and c.
4.1 Minoritarian win probability and supermajorities
We fix the number n of people in the general assembly and the membership
m of the minority faction. We analyse the effect of changing the majority
threshold t for a given size c of the electoral college, by focusing on how
the majority threshold of a lot-based indirect election determines the mwp.
The value of t decides whether a faction is influential, decisive or irrelevant
in the electoral college, but it does not affect the college composition nor
its probability distribution. In other words, if we look at Equation (1), the
supermajority threshold t pins down which values of x enter in the first
summation (for influential colleges), which enter the second summation (for
decisive colleges), and which are left out (for irrelevant ones).
When t is increased, there are less irrelevant and decisive colleges, whereas
the number of influential colleges gets larger. How is mwp affected by these
changes? There is a positive effect because the minority is less often irrel-
evant; and there is a negative effect because it is less likely to be decisive.
The next proposition states that the first effect is stronger than the second:
overall, a larger winning thresholds increases the mwp.
Proposition 4 In a lot-based indirect election, the mwp increases with the
supermajority threshold t, and it is equal to proportional representation un-
der the unanimity rule.
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The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. Raising the super-
majority threshold has both positive and negative consequences: the positive
effect is associated to fewer instances in which a faction is irrelevant and the
negative one with fewer instances in which it is able to control the result of
the election. In absolute terms, gains and losses are equivalent; however, if
we weigh them for the probabilities to occur, the equivalence fails. In fact,
the positive consequences accrue in situations where the faction has few
delegates in the electoral college, whereas the negative impact is produced
when it has many. And, by Proposition 1, a minority is more likely to end
up with a small representation in the electoral college than with a large one.
Therefore, taking into account the odds, the positive effect prevails.
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0.5	
0	 0.1	 0.2	 0.3	 0.4	 0.5	
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Indirect	elections	and	supermajority	threshold	
t=5	
t=7	
t=8	
	PR	
Figure 3: Minoritarian win probability (n = 100, c = 10).
The effect of raising the supermajority threshold is illustrated in Figure 3
where the probability of winning is again computed for n = 100 and c =
10. The three coloured curves correspond to three different values for t,
namely t = 5 (red line), t = 7 (violet line) and t = 8 (green line). As
per Proposition 4, raising t makes the mwp go up and approach the dotted
line that corresponds to proportional representation. Notice also that, for
larger t’s, the lines raise above the horizontal axis for µ closer to zero. This
implies that, for higher t, negligible minorities are less often excluded from
participation.
We conclude that, in indirect elections, the supermajority rule reinforces
the minority protection effect of the college selection by lot.
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4.2 Minoritarian win probability and college size
We now turn our attention to the size of the electoral college. A comparative
static exercise on the parameter c requires some caution. In fact, if the
supermajority threshold t is given, an increase in the college size loosens the
majority requirement. Therefore, to single out the effect of the college size,
we fix the percentage supermajority threshold τ = tc , and let t raise with
c. Notice that, when τ is fixed, few values of c correspond to a well-defined
model: our election problem is discrete, so it is meaningful only if both c
and t are integers. In the following analysis we leave it implicit that we only
consider changes in c that correspond to an integer value of t = τc.
The comparative statics on the college size is less straightforward than
for the majority threshold of Section 4.1 because changes in c affect not only
the electoral outcome, but also the composition of the electoral committee
itself and its probability distribution. For this reason, we give general results
only for extreme values of the college size. The behaviour of the mwp for
intermediate values of c, instead, is illustrated through some simulations.
Consider first the extreme cases. At the lowest possible size for the elec-
toral college (c = 1), the unique delegate is decisive. This implies that the
mwp for a faction of m members equals the probability of having one of its
member chosen to sit in the college, out of a total population of n individu-
als. This yields w = mn = µ. Therefore, the smallest college size corresponds
to proportional representation. At the opposite extreme, the electoral col-
lege can have a size c = n. This is the case of direct elections analysed in
Section 3, where we showed that a minority faction enjoys proportional rep-
resentation only if its allegiance is greater than the supermajority threshold;
otherwise, it is irrelevant and receives no representation. On the basis of
these two cases we see that a larger college size can penalise the minority,
but the penalisation is less damaging for a large majority threshold.
To understand what happens for intermediate values of the college size
we run a series of computer simulations. The results are summarised by two
prototypical situations illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot the mwp for
three different values of the college size, c = 10 (red line), c = 20 (violet
line) and c = 40 (green line). In both simulations we assume n = 100;
the percentage supermajority threshold is τ = 0.5 in the left panel and
τ = 0.8 in the right one. As the picture shows, the changes in the minority’s
probability of winning when raising the college size depend on the values of
14
0.0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.0	 0.1	 0.2	 0.3	 0.4	 0.5	
W	
𝝁	
Indirect	elections	and	college	size	(τ=0.5)	
	
c=10	
c=20	
c=40	
0.0	
0.1	
0.2	
0.3	
0.4	
0.5	
0.0	 0.1	 0.2	 0.3	 0.4	 0.5	
W	
𝝁	
Indirect	elections	and	college	size	(τ=0.8)	
c=10	
c=20	
c=40	
Figure 4: Minoritarian win probability (n = 100).
µ and τ . Hereafter, we give an intuition of the major driving forces behind
these results.
To fix ideas, imagine two situations: one is a negligible minority with
relatively few members (small µ); and the other is a sizeable minority, close
to half of the general assembly (large µ). How do these two minorities differ
with respect to the college size?
Consider negligible minorities first. For large c, a negligible minority
might run short of candidates to fill the electoral college. If this happens
and x ≤ c− t, a faction becomes irrelevant not by bad luck in the sortition
but because it is too small to play a significant role in a large electoral
college. Therefore, the win probability of negligible minorities shrinks when
the size of the electoral college grows. This is seen on both simulations
plotted in Figure 4 where, for small values of µ, the red line lies above the
violet line, and the latter is above the green one.
Figure 4 also shows that the intensity of this effect is larger for small
values of τ. To see why, notice that a minority becomes irrelevant due to a
shortage of members whenever m ≤ c − t. In this case, regardless of how
lucky the faction is in the sortition, it has no chance of winning. This is
equivalent to m ≤ c(1− τ) or, if we divide through by n, to
µ ≤ c
n
(1− τ).
This inequality shows that, when the electoral college size c increases, the
upper bound on µ that deprives a faction of representation increases for any
value of τ, but the increase is larger when the supermajority threshold is
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small, and it becomes nil for τ = 1.5
Altogether, a negligible minority is very often irrelevant in a large college
because it has too few members to fill enough seats of the college; the more
so if the supermajority threshold is low, so that it is easier for the other
faction, which is stronger, to be decisive.
Things are less clear cut for sizeable minorities. For them, running short
of candidates is less of an issue and, as Figure 4 shows, a larger college might
be associated either with a lower representation (for τ = 0.5, as shown in
the left panel of the figure) or a higher one (for τ = 0.8, on the right).
We conclude that a smaller college size is more protective for negligible
minorities but may not be for more sizeable ones.
5 Conclusions
We analysed a class of indirect elections mechanisms in which the electoral
college is chosen at random out of a general assembly and where it is neces-
sary to reach a supermajority threshold to secure the winner. Our interest
was spurred by a related mechanism in use in the patrician Republic of
Venice for more than 500 years.
Under the restriction that there are only two factions, we study the
minority faction’s probability of winning. We show that this mechanism,
compared to a direct election, protects the minority by guaranteeing a higher
probability of winning, without unduly penalising the majority, because the
probability stays always smaller than the proportional representation of the
minority faction in the assembly. We investigate how the protection of the
minorities varies with the college size and the supermajority threshold. We
find that a smaller college size is more protective for negligible minorities
but not necessarily so for more sizeable ones, and that larger supermajorities
thresholds are more protective.
The family of elections studied in this paper departs from the Venetian
protocol in two respects: (a) we restricted attention to two-round proce-
dures, and (b) we looked at the case of an electorate divided in just two
factions. Extensions to multi-round procedures can be easily done along the
lines of Mowbray and Gollmann (2007); their results suggest that iterating
5 From Proposition 3 we already know that with the unanimity rule (τ = 1) we get
proportional representation for any college size.
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many times lot and qualified majority elections raises the minoritarian win
probability. A more interesting extension would be to go beyond (b) and
study lot-based indirect elections with more than two factions. This is less
trivial because it would require an analysis of strategic voting on the one
hand, and of coalition formation on the other.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: First, consider x ≤ m, which implies px > 0. Then either y > m, in which
case py = 0 and thus px > py = 0, or else y ≤ m and py 6= 0. In the latter case the
definition of the binomial coefficient and y = c− x imply:(
m
x
)
=
m!
x!(m− x)! =
(
m
y
)
y!(m− y)!
x!(m− x)! =
(
m
y
)
(c− x)!(m− c+ x)!
x!(m− x)! . (2)
By an analogous reasoning we obtain:(
n−m
c− x
)
=
(
n−m
c− y
)
(c− y)!(n−m− c+ y)!
(c− x)!(n−m− c− x)!
=
(
n−m
c− y
)
x!(n−m− x)!
(c− x)!(n−m− x− c)! .
(3)
We now use (2) and (3) to express px as a function of py:
px =
(
m
x
)(
n−m
c− x
)
(
n
c
) =
=
(
m
y
)(
n−m
c− y
)
(
n
c
) (m− x− c)!
(m− x)!
(n−m− x)!
(n−m− x− c)! =
=py
(m− x− c)!
(m− x)!
(n−m− x)!
(n−m− x− c)! =
=py
(n−m− x)
m− x ·
(n−m− x− 1)
(m− x− 1) . . .
(n−m− x− c+ 1)
(m− x− c+ 1) > py,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that, being m < n/2, each fraction
in the last line is greater than one.
Next, consider the case x > m. Since x < y, we have y > m and, therefore,
px = py = 0. This completes the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: Suppose w = 0. Given the definition of w in (1), it must be px = 0 for
any x ≥ c − t + 1. But with the hypergeometric distribution px = 0 if and only if
x > m. It follows that m < c− t+ 1, a contradiction.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: First we prove that w ≤ µ. Start with Equation (1) from page 7:
w =
t−1∑
x=c−t+1
px
x
c
+
c∑
x=t
px.
Add and subtract both
∑c−t
x=0 px
x
c and
∑c
x=t px
x
c to get
w =
c∑
x=0
px
x
c
−
c−t∑
x=0
px
x
c
−
c∑
x=t
px
x
c
+
c∑
x=t
px.
For the hypergeometric distribution the expected value
∑c
x=0 pxx is equal to
m
nc .
Inserting this value in the equation above and rearranging the terms yields
w =
m
n
−
c−t∑
x=0
px
x
c
+
c∑
x=t
px(1− x
c
)
We can simplify this expression and switch to a new summation index in the
last term, yielding:
w =
m
n
−
c−t∑
x=0
px
x
c
+
c−t∑
x=0
pc−x(1− c− x
c
)
=
m
n
−
c−t∑
x=0
(px − pc−x)x
c
.
(4)
We now use Proposition 1 to sign the last term of this equality. By definition
of supermajority threshold, t > c2 . Then, for any value of x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , c − t}, we
know that x < c− x. Since x+ (c− x) = c the proposition applies and, thus, each
term (px − pc−x) in the sum is non-negative. This implies w ≤ µ.
To complete the proof consider t = c. Then neither faction can be decisive and
Equation (4) reduces to
w =
m
n
−
0∑
x=0
(px − pc−x)x
c
=
m
n
= µ.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: Fix n, m and c. Abusing notation, we drop these three parameters and
write w[t] for the mwp given a value of the supermajority threshold t < c. It is
enough to show that when we raise the threshold from t to t + 1, the difference
∆tw = w[t+ 1]− w[t] is positive.
Using the definition of mwp given in Equation (1) we write
w[t] =
t−1∑
x=c−t+1
px
x
c
+
c∑
x=t
px.
Similarly, the winning probability for a threshold t+ 1 is
w[t+ 1] =
t∑
x=c−t
px
x
c
+
c∑
x=t+1
px.
Notice that all the terms in w[t] and w[t+ 1] are the same except for those indexed
by c− t and t. Then the difference ∆tw reduces to:
∆tw = pc−t
c− t
c
+ pt
t
c
− pt = c− t
c
(pc−t − pt). (5)
To determine the sign of ∆tw notice that c − t ≥ 0 by definition of supermajority
threshold. This implies that ∆tw has the same sign as (pc−t − pt). Since the
pair of probabilities pc−t and pt satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1 and we
are computing w for a minority faction, we know that (pc−t − pt) ≥ 0 and thus
conclude that ∆tw ≥ 0.
To complete the proof consider the unanimity rule. When t = c the mwp is:
w =
c−1∑
x=1
px
x
c
+ pc =
1
c
(
c∑
x=1
px x− pcc) + pc = 1
c
c∑
x=1
px x =
m
n
where the last equality follows from the fact that the expected value
∑c
x=1 px x is
equal to mcn for a hypergeometric random variable.
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